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PART ONE The American Discovery of Vietnam |
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3 | (18) |
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3 | (2) |
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5 | (12) |
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17 | (4) |
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From Pearl Harbor to the Japanese Coup |
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21 | (16) |
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21 | (3) |
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24 | (5) |
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29 | (8) |
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From the Japanese Coup to V -- J Day |
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37 | (14) |
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43 | (2) |
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Policy at the Field Level |
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45 | (6) |
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The Chinese Occupation of North Vietnam, August -- October, 1945 |
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51 | (26) |
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The Occupation and the Viet Minh |
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53 | (6) |
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59 | (5) |
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Americans in Southern Vietnam |
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64 | (4) |
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68 | (9) |
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PART TWO The Franco -- Viet Minh War |
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``Heading Into a Very Bad Mess'': Origins of Military Aid |
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77 | (28) |
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A Reluctance to Intervene |
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77 | (8) |
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The French Offensive of 1947 |
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85 | (5) |
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90 | (7) |
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97 | (8) |
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Establishing a Military Assistance Program |
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105 | (18) |
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105 | (1) |
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106 | (5) |
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The Melby-Erskine Mission |
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111 | (4) |
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The Military Assistance Advisory Group |
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115 | (8) |
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Defeats in Tonkin, Deliberations in Washington |
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123 | (12) |
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Increasing Aid and Continuing Debate |
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126 | (5) |
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131 | (4) |
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The de Lattre Interlude, 1950 -- 1951 |
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135 | (14) |
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Viet Minh Offensives in Tonkin |
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136 | (5) |
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141 | (3) |
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Solving the Supply Problem |
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144 | (5) |
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Looking for a Way Out, January 1952 -- February 1953 |
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149 | (18) |
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Problems of a Vietnamese Army |
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153 | (2) |
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155 | (2) |
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157 | (5) |
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The Light Battalion Proposal |
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162 | (2) |
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The Unconventional Warfare Option |
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164 | (3) |
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The Road to Dien Bien Phu |
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167 | (24) |
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170 | (6) |
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176 | (3) |
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The Second O'Daniel Visit |
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179 | (3) |
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182 | (9) |
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The Question of Intervention |
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191 | (28) |
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194 | (4) |
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The Debate Over Intervention |
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198 | (6) |
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204 | (4) |
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The Army Resists Intervention |
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208 | (11) |
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PART THREE Going It Alone |
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``Political Considerations Are Overriding'': The Decision on Training |
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219 | (12) |
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Reorganizing the Vietnamese Army |
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221 | (3) |
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224 | (1) |
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225 | (3) |
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228 | (3) |
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231 | (24) |
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232 | (6) |
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Establishing a Training Mission |
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238 | (5) |
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Confrontations With the Sects |
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243 | (7) |
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250 | (5) |
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Picking Up the Pieces, 1955 -- 1956 |
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255 | (20) |
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The Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission |
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257 | (5) |
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South Vietnamese Force Structure |
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262 | (6) |
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Dealing With the Threat From the North |
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268 | (7) |
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Building a Vietnamese Army, 1956--1959 |
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275 | (28) |
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The State of the Vietnamese Army |
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278 | (4) |
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282 | (4) |
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286 | (5) |
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291 | (4) |
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295 | (8) |
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Roots of a New War, 1957 -- 1959 |
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303 | (26) |
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306 | (2) |
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308 | (2) |
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Communist Strategy After Geneva |
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310 | (6) |
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316 | (4) |
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Forces for Internal Security |
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320 | (5) |
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The Situation Deteriorates |
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325 | (4) |
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Things Fall Apart, July 1959 -- June 1960 |
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329 | (20) |
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329 | (8) |
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The Viet Cong Take the Offensive |
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337 | (6) |
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The Breakdown of the Army |
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343 | (6) |
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``Something Extra and Special'' |
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349 | (26) |
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The Counterinsurgency Controversy |
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349 | (8) |
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357 | (4) |
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The Counterinsurgency Plan |
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361 | (8) |
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369 | (6) |
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375 | (6) |
| Bibliographical Note |
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381 | (6) |
| Index |
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387 | |
Other versions by this Author
