
Industrial Organization: Contemporary Theory and Empirical Applications, 4th Edition
by Lynne Pepall (Tufts University); Dan Richards (Tufts University); George Norman (Tufts University)Rent Textbook
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Summary
Author Biography
Dan Richards is Professor of Economics at Tufts University. Professor Richards received his A.B. in economics and history from Oberlin College and his Ph.D. in economics from Yale University. Professor Richards has written numerous articles in both macroeconomics and industrial organization, appearing in the American Economic Review, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Journal of Industrial Economics, Economica, the B. E. Journals in Economic Analysis and Policy, Canadian Journal of Economics, the Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, and the American Journal of Agricultural Economics. He came to Tufts in 1985 and has taught at both the graduate and undergraduate levels. He served as Director of the Graduate Program in Economics from 1989 through 1998, and has also served as a consultant to the Federal Trade Commission. From 1996 to 2005 he taught in the Sloan Fellows Program at MIT's Sloan School of Management. Professor Richards lives in Newton, Massachusetts, with his two sons, a dog, three rabbits, and his wife, a co-author of this book.
George Norman holds the William and Joyce Cummings Family Chair of Entrepreneurship and Business Economics at Tufts University. He came to Tufts in 1995 from Edinburgh University, where he had served as head of the department of economics. Prior to that, Professor Norman was the Tyler Professor of Economics at the University of Leicester (England). Professor Norman attended the University of Dundee (Scotland) where he was awarded the M.A. in economics with first class honors. He received his Ph.D. in economics from Cambridge University. His more than 70 published articles have appeared in such professional journals as the American Economic Review, Review of Economic Studies, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Journal of Industrial Economics, and International Journal of Industrial Organization. He is currently an Associate Editor for two journals, the Bulletin of Economic Research and Regional Science and Urban Economics. He is also on the editorial board of the B.E. Journals in Economic Analysis and Policy. In addition to this book, Professor Norman has written and edited, either alone or in collaboration with others, 17 other books. Professor Norman has taught courses in industrial organization and microeconomic theory at both the graduate and undergraduate levels. He has also taught introductory economics, corporate strategy, international economics, and entrepreneurship. Professor Norman lives in Newbury, Massachusetts, with his wife Margaret who, while not a co-author, has provided invaluable support and assistance in his work on this book.
Table of Contents
List of Figures | |
List of Tables | |
About the Authors | |
Preface to the Fourth Edition | |
Foundations | |
Industrial Organization: What, How, and Why? | |
What Is Industrial Organization? | |
How We Study Industrial Organization | |
Why? Antitrust and Industrial Organization Theory Summary Problems References Appendix: Excerpts from Key Antitrust Statutes | |
Basic Microeconomics | |
Competition versus Monopoly: The Poles of Market Performance | |
Profit Today versus Profit Tomorrow: Firm Decision-making over Time | |
Efficiency, Surplus, and Size Relative to the Market Summary Problems References | |
Market Structure and Market Power | |
Measuring Market Structure | |
Measuring Market Power | |
Empirical Application: Monopoly Power-How Bad Is It? Summary Problems References | |
Technology and Cost | |
Production Technology and Cost Functions for the Single-product Firms | |
Sunk Cost and Market Structure | |
Costs and Multiproduct Firms | |
Noncost Determinants of Industry Structure | |
Empirical Application: Cost Function Estimation-Scale and Scope Economies Summary Problems References | |
Monopoly Power in Theory and Practice | |
Price Discrimination and Monopoly: Linear Pricing | |
Feasibility of Price Discrimination | |
Third-degree Price Discrimination or Group Pricing | |
Implementing Third-degree Price Discrimination or Group Pricing | |
Product Variety and Third-degree Price Discrimination or Group Pricing | |
Third-degree Price Discrimination or Group Pricing and Social Welfare Summary Problems References | |
Price Discrimination and Monopoly: Non-linear Pricing | |
First-degree Price Discrimination or Personalized Pricing | |
Second-degree Price Discrimination or Menu Pricing | |
Social Welfare with First- and Second-degree Price Discrimination Summary Problems References | |
Product Variety and Quality Under Monopoly | |
A Spatial Approach to Horizontal Product Differentiation | |
Monopoly and Horizontal Differentiation | |
Is There Too Much Product Variety? | |
Monopoly and Horizontal Differentiation with Price Discrimination | |
Vertical Product Differentiation | |
Empirical Application: Price Discrimination, Product Variety, and Monopoly versus Competition Summary Problems References Appendix A: Location Choice with Two Shops Appendix B: The Monopolist's Choice of Price When Her Shops Have Different Costs | |
Commodity Bundling and Tie-in Sales | |
Commodity Bundling and Price Discrimination | |
Required Tie-in Sales | |
Complementary Goods, Network Externalities, and Monopoly Pricing | |
Antitrust, Bundling, and Tie-in Sales Summary Problems References Appendix: Formal Proof on the Inefficiency Induced by the Marketing of Complementary Goods by Separate Monopolists | |
Oligopoly and Strategic Interaction | |
Static Games and Cournot Competition | |
Strategic Interaction: Introduction to Game Theory | |
Dominant and Dominated Strategies | |
Nash Equilibrium as a Solution Concept | |
Static Models of Oligopoly: The Cournot Model | |
Variations on the Cournot Theme: Many Firms and Different Costs | |
Concentration and Profitability in the Cournot Model Summary Problems References | |
Price Competition | |
The Bertrand Duopoly Model | |
Bertrand Reconsidered | |
Bertrand in a Spatial Setting | |
Strategic Complements and Substitutes | |
Empirical Application: Brand Competition and Consumer Preferences-Evidence from the California Retail Gasoline Market Summary Problems References | |
Dynamic Games and First and Second Movers | |
The Stackelberg Model of Quantity Competition | |
Sequential Price Competition | |
Credibility of Threats and Na | |
Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved. |
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