Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 16

Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here. Topics explored in Volume 16 include moral worth, moral testimony, moral evaluation, expressivism, reasons, and normativity.

Russ Shafer-Landau

Russ Shafer-Landau is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is the author of Moral Realism: A Defence (OUP 2003), which received an honourable mention for the 2005 APA Book Prize, Whatever Happened to Good and Evil? (OUP 2004), and The Fundamentals of Ethics (OUP 2009).

1. The Ontic Cosmic Coincidence Problem for Non-Naturalism about Morality, Nadeem J.Z. Hussain
2. Expressivism about Gender, Sarah McGrath
3. If You're Quasi-Explaining, You're Quasi-Losing, Derek Baker
4. Inferential Expressivism and the Negation Problem, Luca Incurvati and Julian J. Schl?der
5. Metasemantics for the Relaxed, Christine Tiefensee
6. Reasons, Competition, and Latitude, Justin Snedegar
7. The Goals of Moral Worth, Nathan Robert Howard
8. Approving on the Basis of Moral and Aesthetic Testimony, Daniel Wodak
9. Evaluation Turned in on Itself: The Vindicatory Circularity Challenge to the Conceptual Ethics of Normativity, Tristram McPherson and David Plunkett
10. Explaining our Knowledge of Normative Supervenience, Vilma Venesmaa
11. The Modal Status of Moral Principles, Gideon Rosen