| Introduction: George Molnar and Powers |
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1 | (19) |
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19 | (205) |
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The Elements (I): Properties |
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21 | (26) |
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21 | (1) |
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22 | (3) |
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Selective Realism about Properties |
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25 | (3) |
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Predicates and properties are not isomorphic |
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25 | (2) |
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Dispositional predicates and power properties are not isomorphic |
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27 | (1) |
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28 | (19) |
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28 | (2) |
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30 | (3) |
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33 | (4) |
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Essential-necessary-accidental |
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37 | (2) |
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39 | (4) |
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Transferable-non-transferable |
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43 | (4) |
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The Elements (II): On What There Is |
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47 | (13) |
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Objects as Bundles of Properties |
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47 | (4) |
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Foundationism about Relations |
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51 | (3) |
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The Status of States of Affairs |
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54 | (3) |
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Introduction to the Theory of Powers |
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57 | (3) |
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60 | (22) |
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60 | (1) |
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61 | (1) |
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62 | (1) |
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Parallels between Psychological Intentionality and Physical Intentionality |
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63 | (3) |
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Objections to Physical Intentionality |
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66 | (16) |
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Impossible intentional objects |
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66 | (2) |
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Unique intentional objects |
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68 | (2) |
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The threat of panpsychism |
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70 | (1) |
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71 | (1) |
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Intentionality and meaning |
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71 | (10) |
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Summary: The intentionality of powers |
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81 | (1) |
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82 | (17) |
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Is there a Problem about Unmanifesting Powers? |
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82 | (1) |
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Independence and the Conditional Analysis of Powers |
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83 | (11) |
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Naive conditional analysis |
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84 | (5) |
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Causal conditional analysis |
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89 | (3) |
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A reformed conditional analysis |
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92 | (2) |
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Anti-realism about Unmanifesting Powers |
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94 | (5) |
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What is Megaric Actualism? |
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94 | (1) |
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The case against Megaric Actualism |
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95 | (4) |
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99 | (3) |
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102 | (9) |
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Boyle on the Relational Nature of Capacities |
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102 | (3) |
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105 | (3) |
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Are there Any Extrinsic Powers? |
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108 | (3) |
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111 | (14) |
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111 | (2) |
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Anthropocentricism in the Analysis of Powers |
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113 | (12) |
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113 | (3) |
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Hume's argument against strong connections: Exposition |
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116 | (5) |
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Hume's argument against strong connections: Evaluation |
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121 | (4) |
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125 | (18) |
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The Thesis that Powers Need Grounds |
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125 | (1) |
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Motivations for the Thesis |
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125 | (2) |
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125 | (1) |
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126 | (1) |
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Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson's Argument for a Causal Base |
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127 | (4) |
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131 | (6) |
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The problem of the missing base |
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131 | (1) |
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132 | (1) |
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133 | (4) |
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What if There Are Ungrounded Powers? |
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137 | (6) |
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137 | (3) |
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Truncating functionalism? |
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140 | (1) |
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141 | (2) |
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143 | (15) |
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Derivative Powers and Basic Powers |
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143 | (5) |
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143 | (3) |
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Consequences of derivation |
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146 | (2) |
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Theories of the Ontology of Powers---a Taxonomy and an Interim Evaluation |
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148 | (10) |
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149 | (1) |
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149 | (4) |
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153 | (1) |
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154 | (1) |
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154 | (4) |
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158 | (15) |
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158 | (1) |
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Properties that Are not Powers |
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158 | (4) |
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The Causal Relevance of Non-Powers |
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162 | (2) |
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How Can Properties that Are not Powers be Causally Relevant? |
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164 | (2) |
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Alternative Theories of Non-Powers |
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166 | (7) |
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166 | (1) |
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167 | (1) |
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168 | (1) |
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168 | (1) |
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Properties that do not entail conditionals |
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169 | (1) |
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Spatio-temporal properties |
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169 | (4) |
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173 | (13) |
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173 | (1) |
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`Always packing, never travelling' |
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173 | (8) |
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What makes the regress vicious: Space occupancy? |
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174 | (2) |
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What makes the regress vicious: Conditionals? |
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176 | (1) |
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What makes the regress vicious: Lack of qualities? |
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177 | (2) |
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Moderate dispositionalism |
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179 | (1) |
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Dispositionalism reassessed |
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180 | (1) |
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181 | (5) |
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186 | (38) |
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Towards a Dispositional Theory of Causation |
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187 | (13) |
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188 | (2) |
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The contested characteristics of causation |
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190 | (4) |
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Effects are polygenic; manifestations are not |
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194 | (4) |
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Single-track versus multi-track powers? |
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198 | (1) |
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199 | (1) |
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199 | (1) |
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200 | (24) |
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The options: Reductionism versus eliminativism versus primitivism |
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200 | (2) |
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Reductionism (I): Combinatorial theories |
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202 | (13) |
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Reductionism (2): Stark realism about worlds (Lewis) |
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215 | (4) |
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Eliminativism: The regularity theory of logical truths |
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219 | (4) |
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223 | (1) |
| References |
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224 | (9) |
| Index |
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233 | |
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